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1. Introduction
In [A] , Mas-Colell showed the existence of a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium distribution (CNED) as a consequence of the Fan-Glicksberg
theorem. Mas-Colell also showed the existence of a symmetric CNED in
finite-action, atomless games as a consequence of the Kakutani fixed
point theorem and results in the theory of integration of correspon-
dences. These results consist, in particular, of Lyapunov's theorem
on the range of a vector measure, Aumann's measurable selection
theorem, as well as his theorem on the upper heraicontinuity of the
integral of a correspondence with upper-heraicontinuous values; on all
of this [1] is a standard reference.
In this note, we show that in a finite-action, atomless game every
CNED can be "symmetrized" to yield a symmetric CNED. This allows us
to deduce Mas-Colell' s result on the existence of a symmetric CNED
from his first result on the existence of a CNED. The proof of our
result is elementary in the sense that it uses only Lyapunov's theorem
on the convexity of the range of a scalar measure.
Section 2 recalls the model and presents the results. Section 3
gives the basic idea of the proof and Section 4 is devoted to the
formalities of the proof. Section 5 concludes with a remark.
2. The Model and Results
We recall for the reader's convenience the basic definitions from
[4]. Let A be a compact, metric space of actions
, /tL the set of Borel
probability measures on A endowed with the weak * topology and £/ is
the space of continuous from AxHt into R and endowed with the
supremum-norm topology. A game is a Borel probability measure on vC
A*
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A Borel probability measure t is said to be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
distribution (CNED) of the game y if the marginal of t on Ci . , T , is
y and x(B ) = 1 where B = {(a,u) e Ax^f : u(a,T.) ^> u(a,x ) for all
a e A} and t. denotes the marginal of t on A. t is said to be a
A
symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution if t is a CNED and
there exists a measurable function h: £o. * A such that t (graphA
h) = 1. We shall say that every CNED t can be symmetrized if there
s
exists a symmetric CNED t such that B = B .ST
T
We can now state
Theorem . Every Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution of a game y with
action set A can be symmetrized if y is atomless and A is finite .
This yields as a corollary
Corollary (Mas-Colell) : A symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium distri-
bution exists for a game y with action set A whenever y is atomless
and A is finite .
The Corollary is an easy consequence of our theorem and Theorem 1
of [4].
3. Heuristics of the Proof
We illustrate the basic idea of the proof of our theorem by con-
sidering an action set with two elements. The reader may wish to keep
Figure 1 in mind as we go through the argument.
Let t be the CNED of a game y with action set {a ,a }. Let the
set B of all pay-offs and corresponding pay-off maximizing actions be
>Z7
i
«- V2^ /^-
u.
->
?
—
1"
vi2- uin\
A\V 4 #, —_>
Figure 1
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denoted by the set (a.xU.) U( a o xU ? ). Unlike Figure 1, U. and U need
not necessarily be connected sets. Suppose, again unlike Figure 1,
that U. C\ U = $. Since U \J U = £/ , t can be shown to be symmetric
CNED simply by letting h(u) = a for all u e U. , for all i = 1, 2.
Certainly h is measurable and t (graph h) = 1. Thus, in the case
U, C\ U- = 4>, there is nothing to prove.
Suppose U. HU» * $• The basic idea in this case is to "dis-
*
jointify" U, and U~
,
i.e., to construct measurable subsets U. (Z. U.
* *
for all i = 1, 2, such that U H U = $• Since y is atomless, this
can be done in a number of ways but the important consideration is to
do this in such a way that the marginal of x on A, x , does not change.
Pi.
Since B depends only on x., this ensures that B does not change. We
T A T
now briefly spell out the mechanics of such a procedure.
Let V = U - U. , i = 1, 2, j * i, and V = U HU . Find mea-12 12 12
surable subsets V^, V of V^ such that V^HV^ = <j>, V U V =
V
12
and u(V^) = T(a *V ), 1 - 1, 2. Since Z x(a.xV ) -
2 i=l
t(_U (a i xV l2 )}
= T({ a
1
»
a
2
>
xV
1 2
) = t
a
(V
12 )
=
"tS^ll*'
Lya Punov
'
s
i = l
theorem on the range of an atomless scalar measure guarantees that12 * i
V and V can be found. Now let U = V. (J V , i = 1, 2. These are
the sets that work by letting h: LC.. + A be a function such that
* s
h(u) = a for all u e U. , for all i = 1, 2. Now let t (B) =
y{u e \Ji .'• (h(u),u) e B} for any measurable subset B of Ax (JL. . t is
the symmetric CNED. The only point which needs to be checked is that
x^ » x. But T.({a. }) = x(a .x£t.) - x(a xU.) = x(a xV ) + x(a.xV 10 ) =AA Ai iA ii ii il2
u(V.) + u(V^) = M(Vi VJvJ2 ) = M(U*) = y{u e Ct^ (h(u),u) e (a.x^)} =
x^((a
i} ).
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4. Proof of the Theorem
We begin with an elementary lemma.
Lemma 1 . Let A ( i = 1 , . . . , k) and B be arbitrary sets. Then
~~
k
k
U (A xB) = (( A )xB).
i=l i=l
Proof : Straightforward. II
Our next lemma is a simple consequence of Lyapunov's theorem on
the range of a scalar measure.
L emma 2 . Let (S,/^ , u) be an atomless measure space. If V e A ,
n
u(V) = E X with X >_ for all i , there exist for all i = 1, ... t n,
V
1 £^ such that V1 A V J - <j> (i * j ) , \J V = V and y(V ) = X.
.
i=l X
Proof: We shall prove the lemma by induction. The lemma is trivially
true for n = 1. Assume it to be true for n = k and let V £ /Q with
k+1
y(V) = E X., X.
_> for all i = 1, ..., k+1. If X. = for any i,
i=l X
X X
we are reduced to the case of n = k and the proof is completed by
letting V. = <(> for that i. Thus, suppose X. > for all i. Let
k 1 k+1
X(l) = E X./ E X. and X(2) = 1 - X(l). By Lyapunov's theorem
1=1 X i=1 X k+1 / k+1
[1, p. 45], we can find V e A such that y(V ) = X, . . Since
k+1 (/ k+1
k
(V-V ) e ^ , and jj(V-V ) = E X. , we use the induction hypothesis
i=l 1
to complete the proof. II
Before we present the proof of Theorem, we develop some notation.
Let I denote the set {1, 2, ..., n} and P(l) the set of subsets of I,
including the empty set. For any tt z P(I), let tt denote the comple-
ment of tt in I. Let P (I) = {it e P(I): m e tt}. We shall use the
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convention that a union over the empty set is the empty set. We also
use the same notation for a point and a set consisting solely of that
point.
Proof of Theorem
Let t be the Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution of the game \i.
Let U. = proj /,. (B n(a.xCO) for all iel
1 fX\ T i a
en U », ^iel
rtainly U. C ££. for Iel. On the other hand, let u e <-c A • Cer-J i A ACe
tainly there exists k e I such that u(a, ,t) _> u(a x). Then
(a, ,u) e B and hence u e U, .
k t k
(2) B
t
= \J (a.xU.)
iel
Certainly (a xUj CL B for all iel. Now any element x of B can belit t
written as (a.,u) for some iel and some u e £c« Hence u e U. and
1 A 1
x e ( a . xU . )
.
l i
(3) tU.xU.) = i(a.x# )11 l A
Since (a x(J. ) <z. (a x d ) , certainly r(a.xU.) < T(a.x^). Supposeii I A i i — I A
there exists iel such that strict inequality holds for that i.
Then 1 = t(B ) = t( \_J (a xU)) = t(AxCL), a contradiction to the
iel
fact that t is a probability measure.
For any tt e P(I), let V = ( C\ U.) - ( U U.).
TT .1 C 1
i etr l eir
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(4) (a) U V = ti (b) V ft V = 4>(TT,acP(I),Tr^a), (c) ^ V = U,
n/TN ir A tt a n i /TN iriTreP(I) ttcP (I)
For (a), pick u e CC.. Let or - {I e I: u e U. }. By (1), a # <j>.
Then u e V . On the other hand, u e v ,J V implies that there
irePd)
exists a e P(I), a #
<f>
such that u e V . Hence u e U for all i e a
a i
and hence, by (1), u e "£v.« For (h) , suppose there exists tt, o in P(I)
such that tt t a and V f\ V # 4. Since V and V are nonempty, tt and
tt a tt a
a are nonempty. Then there exists i e tt, i k o. Now u e V f|V
tt a
implies u e U.. Since i e a , u e V which is a contradiction. For
(c), pick u e *—i—' V . Then there exists tt e P (I) such that
ireP
1 (I) *
u e V . Since i e tt, u e U.. On the other hand, for any u e U. , let
TT 1 1
O - {j el. ueU.} and tt = {i } U a. Certainly u e V and tt e P (I).
J TT
(5) For any tt e P(I), -(measurable V1 (iel), V 1 f\ V^ = d>(i*J), I J V
1
= V
~~^
TT tt TT
,
>*' TT tt
1 ETT
and yCV
1
) = x(a.xV )TT 1 TT
Observe that y(V ) - ?., (V ) - t(AxV ) = t( ( LJ a.)xV ) which, by
TT ££ TT TT . T 1 TTA 1 el
Lemma 1, equals t(( I) a . xV ) ) = E x(a.xV ). We can now apply
. t i tt . T 1 TTiel lei
Lemma 2 to complete the proof of (5).
Now let U. = W-> V 1 .
1 D l/ T s TTtteP (I)
(6) For all i e I, (a) U* Gl^, (b) U* C\ U* - cf> (i*j), (c) [J U* = li^
i el
* i
To see (a), pick u e U. . Then there exists tt e P (I) such that
u e V . This implies u e V . Since i e tt, u e U.. (b) follows from
TT Tt 1
the fact that for i * j , V H V - 4 on the one hand, and from
TT TT
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V f\ V = <}> for it * a on the other. For (c) , note that
tt o
uvuu VU U O v 1 = U U v 1 - U v =
iel iel ireP (I) iel TreP(I) v tteP(I) iel w ireP(I) "
Cc , the last step from (4a).
(7) p(U.) = x(a xU ) for all iel.
The left hand side equals p( I—,—> (V 1 )). Since V 1 d V by (5), and
1, _ N TT TT TT
•rreP (I)
V f\ V (Ji for tt * o by (Ac), this equals Z y(V ). By (5), this
TT eP ( I
)
equals E. x(a. xV ) which equals t( '
—
;—
' (a.xV )). By Lemma 1,
this can be written as x(a.x »
—
:
—
' V ) and hence by (4b) as x(a.xij.).
i Di,.v tt
3 l i
ireP (I)
We are now ready to construct our symmetric Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium distribution. Let h: vC, + A be such that h(u) = a J for allA i
* i *
u e U, , for all iel. Since V are measurable, U. are measurable,
i tt i
s
Moreover, from (vi), h is a well-defined function. Now let x be a
measure on Ax {£. such that for any measurable B, x (B) = y {u e Cc .:
s(h(u),u) e B}. Given measurability of h and the identity map, x is
well-defined. Also
x
S (graph h) = p{u e (Lk : (h(u),u) e (graph h) } = u {u e ££A > = 1.
g
All that remains to be shown is that x is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
s
distribution. Towards this end, we first show that x = y. Pick
^A
any measurable subset W of {A k • Then x, (W) = x (AxW) =A CL
u {u e £tk : (h(u),u) e AxW} = y {u e (fi^W)} = u(W).
s
Next, we show x = x . Pick any measurable subset of A. If this
set is empty, there is nothing to be shown. Hence, let this set be
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(J a. for some * e P(I). Now t®( (J a ) = t
S
( (J a x^ ) =
u {u e^: (h(u),u) e (( (J a £ ) x tlj } = y {u ef^: h(u) = alf
ieir
i e tt} = n((J h
_1
(a.)) = I u(U*). Now
E (U*) = £ T(a
i
xU
1
) (by (7))
ieir ieir
- Z T(a iX ^A ) (by (2))
i eir
t((J (a^^))
ieir
= t(( U a i )x ^A ) (by Lemma 1}
ieir
- TA(U .± ).
ieir
We are done.
s
Since t. = T. and since B depends only on t. , B = B . Thus
A A t Ast
T
to show t (B ) = 1. But by the definition of h, graph h OB . Since
s T
T
s s s
t (graph h) = 1, t (B ) = t (B ) = 1. The proof of the theorem is
o T
T
complete. II
5. Concluding Remark
In [2, 3], the authors present an alternative formulation of
Mas-Colell's result in games where pay-offs are represented by
preference relations or by functions which are upper-semicontinuous
in actions. We remark that the theorem proved here applies to that
generalized set-up.
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